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THE POST-CITIZENS UNITED FANTASY-LAND
Roy A. Schotland*
First, a bouquet for the illuminating facts presented by Professors
Wert, Gaddie, and Bullock.1  They make dramatically clear how minus-
cule independent spending by corporate PACs has been (that is, those
PACs’ direct spending as distinct from support by those PACs or their
corporate sponsors for spending by intermediaries like the Chamber of
Commerce).2  Their showing is borne out by experience this year: corpo-
rate support for campaigns is almost all hidden, flowing through in-
termediaries,3 which is why getting effective disclosure is more
important than ever, as the Court clearly recognizes4 (We probably owe
much to Justice Kennedy for the fact that the opinion treats disclosure as
it does.).5
* Professor Emeritus, Georgetown Law Center.
1 See Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock III, Of Benedick and
Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
469, 719 (2011).
2 See id.
3 Independent spending flows more and more through entities with identity-concealing
names like “Coalition to Protect Seniors” (unlike, for example, National Rifle Association
(NRA) or Chamber of Commerce).  For an example of “how hard it is to crack the secrecy,”
see Mike McIntire, The Secret Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at WK1, available at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/weekinreview/03mcintire.html; see also Matt Viser, Donor
Names Stay Secret as Nonprofits Politick, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/articles/2010/10/07/donor_names_stay_secret_as_non-
profits_politick/ (“Sandy Greiner is a 64-year-old grandmother of six, farming corn and soy-
beans in Iowa while running for the state Senate.  She’s also . . . president of the American
Future Fund, which . . . [is] spending $7.5 million [on at least twenty congressional races this
year, having started early this year with $650,000 in attack ads against Democrat Martha
Coakley, Massachusetts Attorney General, in her] unsuccessful bid for US Senate . . . .”).  A
few days after that story about the American Future Fund, the Fund was the subject of a front-
page article. See Jim Rutenberg et al., Offering Donors Secrecy, and Going on Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/us/politics/12do-
nate.html.
4 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5 His opinion (Justice Thomas did not join the treatment of disclosure but the dissenters
did join it) noted that “‘the sources of funding of political advertising’ are disclosed so that
‘voters are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking’ and the identity of
corporations spending funds on election speech so that shareholders may hold them accounta-
ble,” as summarized in Posting of Trevor Potter, tp@capdale.com, to election-
law@mailman.lls.edu (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://mailman.lls.edu/pipermail/election-
law/2010-September/022947.html (paraphrasing from Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–16).
“A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective dis-
closure has not existed before today.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.  Disclosure enables
the public to determine “whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed
interests.” Id.
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Next, applause for James Gardner’s interesting recasting of the
Court’s approach.  As he says, “so much has been written” in “severe
criticism” of the decision, that we should turn to views that are not mere
“piling on.”6  But we cannot ignore the extent to which “the decision has
been unfairly caricatured and may not have the direct consequences
many predict.”7  Those words opened an article in the Columbia Law
School Magazine, presenting the views of “more than a few faculty
members,” including Professor Briffault.8  The Columbia professors
made clear that “the central holding . . . was neither as revolutionary nor
as consequential as some critics claimed . . . . The floodgates . . . [had
been] already open.”9  As an election law professor at another law school
wrote to me, the reaction to Citizens United has been “disproportionately
rabid[,] . . . over-overwrought.”10
None of that denies at all that the decision may well matter might-
ily.  Independent spending by corporations and unions, although it had
been extensive and legally so, expanded (in 2010, hugely11) because, as
election-law authority Richard Hasen put it orally: “it makes ‘the ask’ so
much easier.”12  I entirely join in deploring the majority opinion; but I
believe we must correct the “disproportionately rabid” reaction.13  Con-
sider, as an example of the sky-is-falling spin, two articles by Ronald
Dworkin, a very (and rightly) highly regarded scholar: The “Devastat-
6 James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 674–75 (2011).
7 Adam Liptak, A Drop in the Bucket, COLUM. L. SCH. MAG., Aug. 31, 2010, at 29,
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/54665/a-drop-in-the-bucket.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 30.
10 E-mail from Justin Levitt, Assoc. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, to Author
(Sept. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
11 See supra note 3; infra note 21. R
12 See E-mail from Richard L. Hasen, William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of
Law, Loyola Law School, to Author (Nov. 23, 2010) (on file with author).
13 In a “correction” that is wonderfully upbeat, Columbia Professor John Coffee notes
one benefit of the decision: “On the positive side . . . law review note writers will now have
topics they can debate endlessly, and this will keep them out of trouble.”  Liptak, supra note 7, R
at 31.  In a strikingly imaginative analysis, Professor Justin Levitt writes that the decision
might enrich the political scene by “pric[ing] candidates out of mass media” and into grass-
root “methods that rely more on volunteer effort.”  Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of
Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1676108.
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ing” Decision14 and The Decision That Threatens Democracy.15  Dwor-
kin ignores this: more than half our fifty States allow “spending of the
sort endorsed in [this] decision [and] political scientists have not been
able to identify differences in corporate influence in the two sets of
states.”16  Are the majority of our States not democracies?  “There is
absolutely no distinction between those states that have bans on corpo-
rate electioneering and those that do not,” says Columbia Professor Na-
thaniel Persily (an election law authority).17  Praise is owed to scholars
who (unlike those unfairly attacking the new decision by ignoring the
majority of our States) have been working on what we may learn from
the different States’ different laws.18
Last, now that we have the decision, the crucial next step is obvious:
to enact the newly, acutely needed updating of federal and state disclo-
sure requirements.  The majority’s opinion makes unarguably clear that
disclosure of funding sources will, even in the new deregulated regime,
continue to be constitutional.19  And given the majority’s approach (not
merely the Court’s result on this case’s hard-to-escape facts20), assuring
14 Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at
39, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/feb/25/the-devastating-deci-
sion/ (“The Court has given lobbyists . . . a nuclear weapon.”).
Democratic Congresswoman of Maryland Donna Edwards gives us a nuclear-weapon-
level reaction to the decision: “The Citizens United ruling will go down in history as one of the
Supreme Court’s worst decisions—the Dred Scott of our time.”  Donna Edwards, A Call to
Bold Action, BOS. REV., Sept. 1, 2010, at 23–24, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR35.5/
edwards.php.
“[T]he fury of critics of the opinion and the fierceness of their criticism” was surprising.
Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. 77, 78 (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/902.pdf.
15 Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May
13, 2010, at 63, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-
threatens-democracy/.
16 Liptak, supra note 7, at 31. R
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Abby K. Blass, Brian E. Roberts & Daron R. Shaw, ‘Pay to Play’ or ‘Money
for Nothing’? Americans’ Assessment of Money and the Efficacy of the Political System, (2010
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://
conference.mpsanet.org/papers/archive.aspx/2010/917873; Raymond La Raja, Will Citizens
United v. FEC Give More Political Power To Corporations?, (2010 American Political Sci-
ence Association Annual Meeting, Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1642175; Brian Roberts et al., Money That Matters: The Role of Money in Campaigns
and Elections, (2010 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Sept. 2, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642589.
19 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915–16 (2010).
20 In light of the facts, one wonders why the dissenters did not concur in the result.
Unlike the broad (indeed, activist) approach of the majority opinion, the result had been ex-
pected to turn on one of several narrow grounds.  Even leading campaign-finance reformers
urged narrow, traditional grounds that would have resulted in Citizens United winning the
case.  For example, the amicus brief for the Brennan Center for Justice said: “The Court should
pull back from the brink of this unwarranted expansion of judicial power and should, instead,
resolve the issues using deeply embedded and time-worn distinctions that have allowed politi-
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effective disclosure is more important than ever.21  Disclosure’s four key
values have never been more clearly at stake:
(1) to provide voters with information that goes beyond
the candidates’ words and past performance and that
may in itself be a significant signal of future
performance;
(2) to hold candidates accountable for the direct contri-
butions they accept and to have the candidates’ ex-
planation of any indirect, independent support;
(3) to hold accountable the deep-pocket independent
supporters (wealthy individuals, corporations and
unions, and special interest organizations) who use
their success in the often opaque economic market-
cal speech by all speakers to flourish while reducing the risk of corruption and the appearance
thereof.”  Supplemental Brief of the Center for Independent Media et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellee at 4, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205).  Simi-
larly, the Supplemental Brief of Former Officials of the ACLU as Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Neither Party at 4, 8, 10, 12, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205),
submitted these arguments: (1) “Hillary: The Movie does not fall within the coverage of
BCRA” because (a) “the communication was not ‘targeted to the relevant electorate,’” (b) “the
statute contains an implicit de minimis exception [for nonprofit advocacy organizations funded
mainly by individuals],” and (c) “the Court should follow the statutory construction principles
set forth in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009)”; and (2) “Citizens United is entitled to ‘as applied’ First Amendment protection under
a proper reading of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).” Id.
21 The Court’s treatment of disclosure completely rejected the Chamber of Commerce’s
arguments against the constitutionality or value of disclosure.  For example, their amicus brief
said, “Because voters can appropriately discount speech if those supporting it are not dis-
closed, there is no important need to compel such disclosures.”  Brief of Amicus Curiae Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Appellant at 9, Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205).  Contrast the Kennedy opinion: “[T]he
public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an elec-
tion . . . . [T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–16.
As this Article is written, independent spenders’ nondisclosure has become a heated cam-
paign issue.  Given the attacks on the Chamber for its nondisclosure and for its unsupported
denials of the charges against it, we now see a new additional benefit of disclosure: to protect
the reputation, for integrity and compliance with law, of organizations engaged in substantial
independent spending. See Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, Obama Steps Up Attack on Chamber,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2010, at A1; Brooks Jackson, Foreign Money? Really? Democrats Ped-
dle an Unproven Claim, FACTCHECK.ORG, Oct. 11, 2010, http://factcheck.org/2010/10/foreign-
money-really/.  (The Chamber of Commerce is somewhat like the Taliban: the Chamber too
wants burqas, not for women but for its donors.)
Consider also these subheadings of a lead front-page Washington Post article: “Fivefold
Rise [in independent spending] from 2006 Midterms; most of the money comes from undis-
closed sources.”  T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Outside Spending up Sharply for Midterms,
WASH. POST., Sept. 4, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100304596.html; see also TAYLOR LINCOLN & CRAIG
HOLMAN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, FADING DISCLOSURE: INCREASING NUMBER OF ELECTIONEERING
GROUPS KEEP DONORS’ IDENTITIES SECRET (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/docu-
ments/Disclosure-report-final.pdf.
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place to pursue success in the political marketplace,
which must remain open to remain democratic22;
and
(4) to hold corporations, unions, and other organizations
accountable to shareholders and members for the
spending of their money on political campaigns.
Briffault adds major value with his examination of the majority’s
new concern that the “complexity” of campaign finance law may in itself
be unconstitutionally burdensome.23  And he rightly points to the fact
that this “complexity concern” may be a substantial hurdle for new dis-
closure provisions.24
Unfortunately, the leading proposal—the DISCLOSE bill recently
offered by Congressional Democrats—faced, in addition to the new
“complexity” hurdle, its own severe flaws.25
22 Professor Briffault puts it so well: “A campaign contribution, or an expenditure by an
independent committee, is by its nature a public act, not because it will necessarily be made in
public but because it is intended to sway the public . . . . To that extent, a contribution or
expenditure is a public matter and a matter of public concern.”  Richard Briffault, Campaign
Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 293 (2010) [hereinafter Briffault, Disclosure].
His pages in this symposium are a jewel-box of memorable comments on campaign fi-
nance, like Judge Guido Calabresi’s 2005 description of the role of private wealth in cam-
paigns as “the huge elephant—and donkey—in . . . all discussions of campaign finance
reform,” Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance Af-
ter Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 656 (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 406
F.3d 159, 161 (2d. Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring)).
Too few have had Judge Calabresi’s insight.  But back in 1932, Professor Louise Over-
acker (the first scholar of campaign finance) noted that issue: “If one refuses to admit defeat
and yet believes that whatever improvement is made . . . must be brought about within the
existing capitalistic economic structure . . . .” LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 381
(Arno Press 1974) (1932).  I drew upon that in lamenting what seemed to me BCRA’s bound-
to-fail overreach:
Professor Overacker was correct to connect campaign finance problems with our eco-
nomic system . . . . Campaign finance law cannot solve this “American Dilemma.”   Our
commitment to political equality coexists with our acceptance of economic inequality and a
commitment against any governmental steps toward reducing economic inequality beyond
very modest ones.  Given that today we are too far from the Athenian agora for political
advocacy to be as low-cost as a soapbox, and that political power has such great potential for
altering economic power, we live with a great gap between One Person/One Vote, versus One
Person/One Voice.  If campaign finance law is to bridge that gap, we cannot overload the
bridge: trying to build barriers against our economic system’s affecting our political system,
overloads the bridge.  Regulatory barriers aimed at stopping flows of funds, are bound to
break down.
Roy Schotland, Act I: BCRA Wins in Congress. Act II: BCRA Wins Big at the Court. Act III:
BCRA Loses to Reality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 335, 343 (2004).
23 See Briffault, Disclosure, supra note 22.  “[C]ampaign finance is a thorny political R
issue, but we can say with some certainty that regulators and the Court have underappreciated
its complexity.”  Blass et al., supra note 18, at 22. R
24 See Briffault, Disclosure, supra note 22. R
25 See Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act (DIS-
CLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
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Perhaps the bill’s excellent acronym accounted for the all-out sup-
port, even enthusiasm, that the bill won from Democrats and other oppo-
nents of the Court’s new approach.26  Perhaps understandably, Briffault
avoids “getting into the merits of . . . DISCLOSE,”27 but the bill’s flaws
are so significant that they must be noted, even if briefly (only major
flaws in the bill’s 112 pages are noted here, and they are not listed in
order of importance).
The bill is remarkably loophole-laden.  It naively (astonishingly so)
includes among “covered organizations” only three kinds of 501(c) orga-
nizations, ignoring obviously available alternative routes for funds,28 for
example, 501(c)(19):
(1) A post or organization of past or present members of
the Armed Forces of the United States, or an auxil-
iary unit or society of, or a trust or foundation for,
any such post or organization . . . .29
Imagine how many veterans’ organizations will
form and at once become conduits for cam-
paign funds.  Also, what of readily available
non-501(c) entities like partnerships and trusts,
and even for-profit corporations to which con-
tributions could be tax-deductible?30
(2) The bill flatly bars corporations from any indepen-
dent campaign spending if they have federal govern-
ment contracts worth $10,000,000 or more.31  By
itself, that would bar all sizable corporations but
leave unions free to exploit the deregulation brought
by Citizens United—reversing more than sixty years
of treating corporations and unions together for cam-
paign finance purposes.  Perhaps such a reversal
should occur, but that provision is utterly beyond
disclosure.  How ironic that a bill aimed at trans-
parency hides behind a false fac¸ade, which happened
because the bill deviated to pursue partisan goals.
That the non-disclosure provisions were com-
pletely separable was made explicit when the spon-
sors admitted, after the bill had been blocked in the
26 See id.; see, e.g., Editorial, Take That, Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, May 10,2010, at
18.
27 See Briffault, Disclosure, supra note 22. R
28 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006); H.R. 5175.
29 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(19).
30 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT
L. REV. 41 (2007); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(19)–1 (2010).
31 See H.R. 5175 § 101(b).
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Senate on September 23, that they (the sponsors)
had told “Senators Snowe and Collins that they were
prepared to change the bill to strip it down to the
disclosure provisions.”32
(3) The sponsors evidently seeking to get a bill
whatever the cost infamously exempted the National
Rifle Association (NRA) from being covered by the
new requirements.33  That move drew such hostile
reactions that the exemption was broadened to in-
clude any organization of “at least 500,000 individu-
als who paid membership dues during the previous
calendar year.”34 But: Don’t we want voters to
know when the NRA or Sierra Club or XYZ funds a
campaign ad?  On the other hand, if we don’t need
disclosure from the major players, do we need—can
we even justify—imposing on smaller organizations
the burdens of reporting?  The smaller the organiza-
tion and the larger the burden, the greater the chill
on their participation, i.e., on their speech.
(4) Where disclosure is required, the requirements are
unworkable: for example, requiring reports not
merely by spenders but also by the bill’s “deemed”
spenders, entities that are actually donors, which
will not have the information they are supposed to
report.
32 See Fred Wertheimer, DISCLOSE Act Falls One Vote Short of Reaching Senate Floor
for Consideration; Statement by Democracy 21 President Fred Wertheimer, DEMOCRACY 21,
Sept. 3, 2010, http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={91FCB139-CC
82-4DDD-AE4E-3A81E6427C7F}&DE={9E11BB95-A043-45FC-B845-66A9247E3A0F}
(emphasis added).
Wertheimer’s statement was candid but unfortunate and again naive.  Even if that bill
failed, unquestionably the efforts to amend disclosure requirements will continue and that
statement will be used by the opposition to show that DISCLOSE itself failed to disclose that it
not only went beyond disclosure, but did so in patently partisan terms.  That statement was
immediately picked up by James Bopp, a leading opponent and litigant. See Posting of James
Bopp, jboppjr@aol.com, to election-law @mailman.lls.edu (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http:/
/mailman.lls.edu/pipermail/election-law/2010-September/022938.html.
After Citizens United, the need for disclosure could not have been greater and the oppor-
tunity for enactment could not be greater, but those responsible for the bill’s deviations and
flaws could not have fumbled more.  Yes, I am upset.  “You never want a serious crisis to go
to waste.”  Gerald Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at A2,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721278056345271.html (quoting Rahm
Emanuel).
Our opportunity was wasted.
33 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Disclose Act in Jeopardy After Interest Groups Balk at NRA
Deal, WASH. POST, June 18, 2010, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR2010061705859.html.
34 H.R. 5175 § 211(c)(27)(B).
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(5) Desirable as disclosure is and even if reporting in-
volved no burden at all, there is such a thing as too
much disclosure.  The bill’s threshold for which do-
nors would be required to report started at $600 “in
an aggregate amount . . . in a calendar year.”35  Pro-
fessor Briffault describes perfectly why too much
disclosure is counter-productive:
[M]assive disclosure . . . threatens to inundate
us in a sea of useless data, while potentially dis-
tracting attention from the big donors whose
funds play a more meaningful role in under-
standing a candidate . . . . The educational value
of knowing about [the amount of the support] is
tied, albeit loosely, to the fraction of a cam-
paign’s war chest attributable to that do-
nor . . . . [T]argeted disclosure aimed at the
largest [supporters] would sharpen the public’s
focus . . . . [And] the reports come fast and furi-
ous as Election Day approaches . . . .36
CONCLUSION
Everyone who cares about protecting voters’ ability to know who is
giving or spending money to sway voters—and also about both the can-
didates’ accountability for their financial support  and their supporters’
accountability for flood-funding campaigns—must move beyond deplor-
ing the Court’s decision.  For at least several years before Citizens
United came down, it was clear as could be that we needed to update
disclosure laws that were obsolete in limiting coverage to only “express
advocacy” efforts.37  We need to do, as soon as we can, what democracy
needs, free of partisan or interest-group goals.
35 H.R. 5175 § 211(a)(5)(A)(ii)(I).  And as that citation surely indicates, this bill is
complex!
36 Briffault, Disclosure, supra note 22, at 299–301. R
37 For an excellent analysis, see COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL., FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL QUALITY, IMPARTIAL-
ITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CALIFORNIA 47–52 (2009), available at http://
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/tflists/documents/cic-finalreport-attacha.pdf.
